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ABSTRACT 
The past decade has seen an increase in the occurrence of natural hazards and the experience in 
Australia has led to a reconsideration of the planning for natural hazards by government and to 
the adoption of a whole-of-nation resilience-based approach to disaster management.   
 
A key component of creating community resilience is the integration of disaster management 
with government and community strategic planning in relation to the social, built, economic and 
natural environments. Joint responsibility of government and the community for ‘land use 
planning systems and building control arrangements [which] reduce, as far as is practicable, 
community exposure to unreasonable risks from known hazards’, is a critical element of a 
resilient community.  
 
As the responsibility for the implementation of land use planning policies in Australia is 
generally with local governments, this paper will examine whether, in light of improved 
predictive technology, the failure of a local government to adequately foresee and make 
provision for a known hazard will give rise to liability for damage or loss of property caused by 
that hazard. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has seen an increase in the occurrence of natural hazards ranging from 
severe earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, polar vortex incidents in the northern 
hemisphere to an increase in heatwaves and drought in the southern hemisphere. While 
speculation continues about whether climate change is a potential cause of extreme 
weather events, there is no denying the increased severity and frequency of these 
extreme events (Bell, 2014).  
 
The experience in Australia has led to a reconsideration of the planning for natural 
hazards by government and to the adoption of a whole-of-nation resilience-based 
approach to disaster management. In 2009, given the fact that disasters have national 
implications, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), agreed to adopt a whole-
of-nation resilience-based approach to disaster management. The result is the National 
Strategy for Disaster Resilience: Building the Resilience of our Nation to Disasters 
which recognises that a ‘national, coordinated and cooperative effort is needed to 
enhance Australia’s capacity to withstand and recover from emergencies and disasters’ 
(COAG, 2011, p ii). The purpose of the national strategy is to develop a disaster 
resilient community which is described as:  
 
…one that works together to understand and manage the risks that it confronts. 
Disaster resilience is the collective responsibility of all sectors of society, 
including all levels of government, business, the non-government sector and 
individuals. If all these sectors work together with a united focus and a shared 
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sense of responsibility to improve disaster resilience, they will be far more 
effective than the individual efforts of any one sector (COAG, 2011, p iv). 
 
A key element of the National Strategy is responsible ‘land use planning systems and 
building control arrangements [which] reduce, as far as is practicable, community 
exposure to unreasonable risks from known hazards’ (COAG, 2011, p 6). In Australia, 
local governments are usually responsible for land use planning within their local 
government areas. Local planning schemes and policies already take into account State 
government policies and regulation as well as the best use of land for the area. The 
National Strategy recommends a further layer of considerations aimed at minimising 
the exposure of private land and buildings to the effects of natural hazards. Advances in 
predictive technology which allow governments to better understand the impact of 
natural hazards on the community and built environment may also heighten the 
expectation of the community that the government will take proactive steps to protect 
them from the consequences of both known and predictable natural hazards. 
 
The central question of this paper is whether the sharing of responsibility for 
ascertaining and mitigating risk of natural hazards through land planning policies alters 
the legal allocation of liability between local governments and landowners for loss 
arising from natural hazards.2 The research examines the current factors relevant to the 
determination of legal responsibility and whether the existing balance of responsibility 
between local government and a landowner is impacted by improvements in the 
reliability and accuracy of predictive technology3and the shared approach to community 
resilience. Our conclusion is that despite the appearance of a shared responsibility a 
landowner will remain responsible for loss arising from natural hazards.  
  
 
POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURES IN LAND USE PLANNING 
Successful actions by landowners against local governments for negligent decisions or 
failures in land use planning are uncommon. However, the increased severity and 
frequency of extreme weather events has given rise to an increase in claims by 
landowners who have suffered catastrophic loss for which they are not insured. For 
example, owners of property affected by the Queensland flood have commenced a claim 
against the State government as the operator of the Wivenhoe Dam claiming 
compensation for negligence and landowners in Victoria claimed for negligent 
maintenance of power lines which contributed to the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires. As 
many insurance policies exclude damage caused by flooding, storm surge and loss from 
coastal erosion and gradual increases in sea levels are not covered by insurance, the 
local government, as the principal decision maker of in relation to  development, will be 
the obvious defendant (Burkett, 2013, pp 776, 783).  
 
The acceptance of shared responsibility by governments under the National Strategy 
and the improved ability to be able to predict extreme weather events raises the issue 
whether this increases the potential liability of local governments. To answer this, the 
principles of liability for negligence as applied to local governments must be 
2  This focus of this paper is on planning policies and therefore does not consider negligent misrepresentation, that 
is, the provision of  negligent advice or information. 
3  This paper is not considering the scenario that the data relied upon was negligently prepared, but is based upon 
the assertion that the data was reasonable and reliable using accepted current scientific methods. 
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examined.4 Key barriers to the imposition of liability upon local government will be 
highlighted. 
 
A landowner seeking to establish negligence against a local government for loss 
suffered as a result of a planning scheme failing to protect against the effects of a 
known natural hazard has significant hurdles to overcome.  Negligence is ‘conduct 
which involves a failure to conform to a legal obligation and failure to protect the 
interests of someone with whose interests a defendant ought to be concerned.’5 
Negligence involves the concept that the acts or omissions of a defendant are judged 
against a standard of reasonableness – did the defendant act with reasonable care in the 
circumstances? To establish negligence the landowner must prove: 
 
(i) the local government owed the landowner a duty of care; 
(ii) the duty was breached by the local government; and  
(iii) the landowner suffered loss as a result of the breach.  
 
Duty of Care 
The law recognises that certain relationships give rise to a duty of care imposing a 
requirement for reasonable care to be taken by one entity not to cause reasonably 
foreseeable loss to the other entity.6  The relationship between a landowner and a local 
government in relation to land use planning and development does not fall within a 
recognised duty of care.  Therefore, a landowner seeking to establish negligence against 
a local planning authority needs to prove by reference to particular factors that a duty of 
care arises. The starting point for establishing a duty of care is proving that the harm 
suffered was reasonably foreseeable.7   
 
Reasonable foreseeability of loss  
In some cases proving that loss from a natural hazard is reasonably foreseeable is 
straightforward. For example a landowner may easily establish that loss from the local 
government allowing the landowner to develop in a flood prone or bushfire area without 
restriction or appropriate safeguards is reasonably foreseeable. For example, in Butler v 
Queensland,8 landowners suffered damage because their land subsided as a result of 
mining activities below their land. The landowners were successful in a claim in 
negligence against the State because the court found there was a foreseeable risk of 
subsidence damage to the surface land of the mine if development was permitted.9 
 
 
4  A landowner who has suffered loss is more likely to seek compensation through an action in negligence than 
breach of statutory duty.  Whether an individual may bring an action for breach of statutory duty depends upon 
the interpretation of the relevant statute as to whether it allows for a private action: O’Connor v S P Bray Ltd 
(1937) 56 CLR 464; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, [78]. An 
action for breach of statutory duty is usually based upon legislation that provides for the protection of the health, 
safety and welfare of specific members of the public. As land use planning is unlikely to fall into this category 
only actions in negligence are considered.  
5  Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, [8].  See generally, Stickley (2013). 
6  For example, the occupier of premises owes a duty of care to entrants (Strong v Woolworths Ltd (t/as Big W) 
(2012) 285 ALR 420) and a school authority is under a duty of care to take reasonable care of students: 
Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 
7  Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations Pty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317, [33]. 
8  [2013] QSC 354. 
9  Ibid, [124]. 
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Reasonable foreseeability of loss of itself will not be sufficient for a court to impose a 
duty of care on a local government. Further factors, dependent upon the situation will be 
considered by the court. 
 
Other relevant factors  
There is no ‘single unifying principle for liability in negligence, easy to apply and 
predictable in outcome’10 and the factors considered relevant to establishing a duty of 
care are very reliant upon the particular facts of the case.  
 
When the defendant is a public authority, a court must take into account the fact that it 
will be subject to other public responsibilities and whether the authority has a discretion 
as to the way in which its statutory powers and functions are carried out, as well as a 
discretion to choose not to exercise its power and functions.11   However, unlike other 
defendants, a public authority may justify that it owes no duty of care because it made 
its decision based upon ‘financial, economic, political or social factors or constraints’.12 
This so-called ‘policy defence’13 means that if the alleged negligence is based upon a 
policy decision, the decision will not be scrutinised by the court.14  In contrast, an 
operational decision of an authority is a decision ‘that is merely the product of 
administrative direction’15 in implementing a policy.   
 
However, proving that the decision of the local government was an operational decision 
one does not by itself establish a duty of care. The other factors noted above (ie the 
functions of the authority are limited by its resources - financial and other, the other 
functions exercisable by the authority, what discretion the local authority has to perform 
the functions) should be taken into account.  Therefore, whether the local government 
owes a duty of care will be decided in the context of all functions and the availability of 
resources, not just its role in relation to land use planning and development.   
 
A court will also consider the degree of control the authority had in relation to the risk 
of harm and the vulnerability of the landowners.16 The control of the authority is 
described as of ‘critical significance’ when determining whether a public authority owes 
a duty of care.17  A planning authority is obviously in a position of control of land use 
and construction standards.  The flip side to control is the vulnerability of the 
landowner.  Vulnerability in this situation is the dependence of the landowner on the 
10  Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, [189] per Kirby J.  In Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v 
Stovar (2009) 75 NSWLR 649, [103] 16 factors in addition to foreseeability were listed but it was stated at [104]: 
‘There is no suggestion in the cases that it is compulsory in any given case to make findings about all of these 
features. Nor should the list be seen as exhaustive. Rather, it provides a non-exhaustive universe of considerations 
of the kind relevant to the evaluative task of imputation of the duty and the identification of its scope and 
content.’ 
11  The fact that a public authority has the power which if it exercised would have prevented loss being suffered by 
the plaintiff does not by itself impose a duty of care: Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1988) 192 CLR 330; Stuart v 
Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215. 
12  Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 469. 
13  See Commonwealth, Review of the Law of Negligence – Final Report, September 2002, [10.13]. 
14  Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540.  See also the civil liability legislation: Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 110; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 42; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 35; Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 38; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 83; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5W. There are no 
equivalents in South Australia or the Northern Territory. 
15  Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 469.It is fair to say that the policy/operational 
dichotomy has attracted much criticism, for example, see  Aronson (2008).  
16  Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, [149]-[150]. 
17  Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, [116]; Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 215; 
Sydney Water Corporation v Turano (2009) 239 CLR 51. 
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authority’s management of the risk.  Arguably, a landowner is vulnerable as there are no 
reasonable steps they can take to protect themselves - if development is approved in an 
area, should the landowner be able to rely on that decision and assume that any known 
or foreseeable risks of developing in the area have been considered by the planning 
authority?18 It should be confidently assumed that in making a decision in any one 
particular instance, the authority has consulted expert opinion and reliable data.  
 
If a duty of care is owed the scope of the duty may be described as a duty to take 
reasonable care not to expose landowners to foreseeable risks of harm that may arise 
from the development of the land that complies with the conditions imposed by the 
authority.  
 
Breach of Duty 
If a duty of care is established, a landowner must then prove that the duty was breached. 
This requires proof that the risk of harm was foreseeable (and not insignificant) and that 
the alleged negligent act or omission of the planning authority was not a reasonable 
response to the risk.19 There are several points that can be made in the context of 
managing risks in land use planning: 
 
(i) Whether there is a foreseeable risk of harm is determined at the time of the 
breach, not in light of later events.20  This means there is more likely a foreseeable 
risk of harm if the land is regularly affected by a particular hazard.21  The 
occurrence of a hazard that has not previously affected the area may not satisfy 
this test. 
(ii) If a landowner suffers loss because the consequences of the hazard were greater 
than predicted, the risk is still foreseeable as the law does not require that the 
chain of events leading to the damage or the extent of the damage be 
foreseeable.22   
(iii) Whether the planning authority acted reasonably in response to the foreseeable 
risk, requires the probability and severity of the risks to be identified, any social 
utility23 and whether there were any reasonable alternative precautions available. 
18  The type of landowner may affect whether the landowner is considered by a court to be vulnerable. For example, 
in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515, a majority of the High Court held 
that the appellant was not vulnerable as it had the ability and resources to protect its commercial interests in the 
purchase of a building. In contrast, a purchaser of a home (not for investment) was considered to be vulnerable in 
Brayn v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609. 
19  See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 43; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5B; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Qld) s 9; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 32; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 11; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 48; 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5B.  See also Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 47-48.  There is 
no equivalent in the Northern Territory.  Note that the civil liability legislation that includes a provision that a 
public authority is not liable for breach of statutory duty unless the act or omission of the authority is so 
unreasonable that no other authority with the same functions would consider it to be a reasonable exercise of its 
functions, has been interpreted in New South Wales and Queensland to not apply to actions in negligence, only 
actions for breach of statutory duty: McKenna v Hunter & New England Local Health District [2013] NSWCA 
476, [167] (reversed on grounds that no duty of care was owed (2014) 314 ALR 505); Patsalis v New South 
Wales (2012) 81 NSWLR 742, [87]; Hamcor Pty Ltd v Hayward [2014] QSC 224. 
20  The foreseeability of the risk cannot be ‘seen through the prism of hindsight’: Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 
CLR 434. 
21  Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40, 47. This risk would not be ‘far-fetched or fanciful”. 
22  Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317. 
23  The law recognises that there must be a balance between the risk and the precautions required to reduce the risk 
and ‘saving life or limb justifies taking considerable risk’: Watt v Hertfordshire County Council [1954] 2 All ER 
368, 371.  Not adopting a precaution to take into account the predicted severity of a known hazard would not fit 
within the idea of social utility as that would be exposing landowners to risk without any benefit for society as a 
whole. 
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Until recently, historical data was the primary source of information and 
obviously a failure to take that historical data into account would be a breach of 
duty.24 However, in light of improvements in predictive technology of natural 
hazards and their potential impact, sole reliance on historical data may not be 
considered reasonable. 
 
The impact of the National Strategy, which emphasises a forward looking strategy for 
dealing with the likelihood of future hazards, relies to a large extent on the ability of 
governments to predict the impact of future events. The reliability of predictive 
technology and whether it is reasonable for a local government to rely upon it are 
considered below.  
 
Damage 
Negligence requires proof of damage.25  The damage must be the result of the breach of 
duty and the law must consider that it is appropriate to hold the defendant liable for that 
loss.26 Legal liability arises for loss that is reasonably foreseeable, even if the extent of 
the damage was not.27  Damage to buildings, chattels and the land itself would be the 
foreseeable loss resulting from a natural hazard, the issue then is whether the breach of 
duty was the cause of that damage.  This requires a court to consider whether had the 
authority adopted the reasonable alternative precaution the landowner would not have 
suffered the loss.  The damage would be within the authority’s scope of liability as it 
would have been the authority’s own unsuitable development approval that was 
responsible for the loss and there would be no public policy reasons to excuse the 
authority from liability. 
 
 
IMPACT OF NATIONAL STRATEGY AND SHARED RESPONSIBILITY 
The National Strategy encourages community resilience to hazards through: 
 
Responsible land use planning [to] prevent or reduce the likelihood of hazards 
impacting communities. Building standards can mitigate the likelihood of loss of 
life, as well as damage to and/or destruction of property and infrastructure 
(COAG, 2011, p 11). 
 
Compliance with the National Strategy arguably requires government to take certain 
steps to minimise the impact of hazards on the community. A number of questions are 
raised for local governments seeking to avoid claims in negligence: 
 
(i) In determining its land use and building requirements, does the government owe a 
duty of care that includes within its scope that it is required to consider historical 
data and predictive information within its knowledge? 
24  See for example, Brown v Heathcote County Council [1986] 1 NZLR 86 where the risk of flood was well 
documented at the time of approval of the building plans.  
25  Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537, [109]; Williams v Milotan (1957) 97 CLR 465, 474. 
26  Under the civil liability legislation, ‘factual causation’ refers to the requirement that the breach was a necessary 
condition of the harm and ‘scope of liability’ is the consideration of whether the defendant should be liable as the 
legally significant cause of the damage.  See Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 45(1); Civil Liability Act 
2002 (NSW) s 5D(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Qld) s 11(1); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 34(1); Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (Tas) s 13(1); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 51(1); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5C(1).  There is no 
equivalent provision in the Northern Territory. 
27  Sydney Water Corporation v Turano (2009) 239 CLR51, [46]. 
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(ii) Is government in breach of its duty of care if it fails to impose restrictions to 
mitigate known and foreseeable risks to property and infrastructure based upon 
predicted future events and their possible impacts? 
 
Does a Local Government have a Duty to Consider Predictive Data? 
As considered above, a local government can argue no duty of care arises because the 
alleged negligence is based upon a policy decision.28 Are decisions about land use 
planning and development approvals classified as policy or operational?  This depends 
upon the circumstances.  A distinction can be drawn between: 
 
(i) A planning authority ignoring all data, conflicting or not,29 as to the future 
impact of natural hazards in the area; and  
(ii) A planning authority choosing between conflicting data as to the future impact 
of natural hazards in the area. 
 
In the first situation, if the planning authority has evidence of the predicted impact of a 
hazard in a particular area but chooses to ignore the evidence, it must be determined 
why the evidence was ignored.  A decision to simply ignore all of the data will be an 
operational decision and may be subject to a duty of care.30  
 
If, as in the second situation there is conflicting data, for example, as to the predicted 
severity and impact of a hazard, the planning authority may argue it is a policy decision 
if it is based upon: 
(i) An inability to expend further funding to resolve the conflict, as resources are 
allocated to other needs; or  
(ii) Adopting strategies to take into account more severe predictions would impose 
hardship upon landowners in the area. 31    
 
However, it remains for a court to determine if such a decision is policy or operational 
and it is suggested that even if there is conflicting data, as long as the data is considered 
reliable, to ignore all data as further studies cannot be carried out due to a lack of 
resources, may be characterised as operational. 
 
Is a Local Government in Breach if it does not Mitigate Foreseeable Risks 
Identified by Predictive Data? 
Whether an event is foreseeable requires an assessment of the probability and severity 
of the risks based upon available data.  Until recently, historical data was the primary 
source of information, but given the improvements in predictive technology and 
increased intensity and frequency of hazards, is it reasonable for a local government to 
continue to just rely on historical data?   
 
28  Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540.  See also the civil liability legislation: Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 110; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 42; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 35; Civil 
Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 38; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 83; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5W. There are no 
equivalents in South Australia or the Northern Territory. 
29  In this paper, any data is assumed to be from accepted and reliable resources. 
30  It is unlikely that an argument that the authority had no financial resources available to carry out further studies to 
enable it to make a better informed decision would be accepted as a policy decision if the evidence, although 
conflicting, is accepted as reliable and the authority chose to ignore all evidence. 
31  For example, Victorian Planning Provisions Amendment VC109 Explanatory Report (Planning and Environment 
Act 1987 (Vic)).  Amendments were made to the BMO to allow site specific solutions and alternative safety 
measures to meet the building construction requirements. 
7  
                                                        
 
 
The inadequacy of historical data was evident during the 2010-2011 floods in 
Queensland.  The extent of these floods was unexpected. The Brisbane City Council 
followed the common practice of basing its planning on the concept of the ‘1 in 100 
year’ flood. The ‘1 in 100 year’ concept was commonly misunderstood by the public to 
mean that if property was above the 100 year flood level it was safe from flooding or 
that floods of such levels would only occur once every 100 years (Queensland Floods 
Commission of Inquiry, 2012, p 69) when in fact it refers to a 1 in 100 chance of a flood 
event equaling or exceeding that level in any one year. This method of modelling has 
since been revised based upon those floods to give a more accurate description to the 
public of the potential risk from flooding.  
 
Whether a local government acted reasonably in response to a foreseeable risk of a 
hazard, requires not only the probability and severity of the risks to be identified but 
also whether there were any reasonable precautions available.   If the authority chose to 
ignore predictive data or previous extreme events and not impose any conditions or take 
other steps to mitigate, there is an increased likelihood of a breach of duty. The simple 
fact there was an alternative does not necessarily amount to a breach of duty – it must 
be established that the alternative was reasonable in the circumstances32 and the 
planning authority acted unreasonably not to adopt that alternative.33 For example, if a 
region had experienced significant flooding and the evidence was that the defined flood 
level (DFL) was no longer applicable but the Council did not review its development 
approvals, landowners would have a strong case against the Council if they complied 
with the development approval and then suffered damage to their property from a later 
flood.  The reasonable alternative, as occurred in the case of the Brisbane City Council, 
was to review the minimum habitable floor heights for developments, allow for a 




Given the availability of reliable data and the acceptance of the science of predictive 
modelling of future natural hazards (Smith, 2013), there would be a reasonable 
expectation that there would be some reliance upon it in the decision making process of 
all levels of government. There would also be a general understanding, if the public are 
properly informed, that any information conveyed to the public upon which they might 
rely to make a serious decision, is based upon predictive  modelling and not only  
historical fact.  
 
The Australian Government acknowledges that ‘strategic land-use planning involves 
striking a balance between competing objectives’ but also recognises that local 
authorities need to consider the impact of climate change, which would be based upon 
predictive data (Australian Government, 2013, [8.2]). A local government is not an 
32  In assessing the reasonableness a court will have regard to the burden of implementing that alternative in terms of 
expense, difficulty and convenience: Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40; Romeo v Conservation 
Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431. 
33  See Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2012) 273 FLR 304 where the plaintiffs alleged 
negligence in the State’s bush fire strategy. In that case it was held that although with hindsight a different 
strategy would have been preferable, there had been no criticism of the strategy when adopted or any alternative 
proposed. 
34  Other mitigation works were also undertaken to prevent flooding through storm water drains from the Brisbane 
River. 
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insurer against all loss arising from the impact of natural hazards upon land-use; the law 
imposes an obligation to act reasonably to ensure that landowners are not exposed to 
foreseeable risks.  Therefore an authority fulfils its duty of care, and has contributed to 
community resilience, if it is has acted reasonably in the circumstances and this would 
include considering the impact of future hazards in the area that are indicated by 
predictive technology and scientific studies and ensuring that such data is reviewed 
regularly to inform any required changes to planning regulations.    
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